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Abstract
Shortly before the disappearance of the European Community, the European Court of Justice
(”ECJ”) handed down three judgments on the free movement of goods relating to the use to which
goods are put. They are remarkable because they put an end to a serious controversy about the
scope of what is now article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (”TFEU”)
(article 28 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (”EC Treaty”)), which saw a con-
siderable divergence in approach between the Advocates General concerned in these cases. The
judgments also surely herald an end to attempts to expand the ambit of the now notorious judgment
in Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard. These cases and their wider implications for
the future scope of article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC Treaty) are the subject of this Article. The
Article first examines and contrasts the approach of the Advocates General in each case chrono-
logically and then the judgments in the order handed down, before turning to draw conclusions for





FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND THEIR USE—
WHAT IS THE USE OF IT? 
Laurence W. Gormley* 
INTRODUCTION 
Gordon Slynn, Lord Slynn of Hadley, was an outstanding 
Advocate General and then judge at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (as it then was),1 more usually referred 
to (if inaccurately) as the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), and 
was later a distinguished member of the Judicial Committee of 
the House of Lords. His passing has rightly been widely lamented 
in legal and other circles,2 and it is with fond affection that I 
 
* B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University; M.Sc. 1976 London University (LSE); 
Barrister, Middle Temple, 1978; LL.D. Utrecht University, 1985; Professor of European 
Law & Jean Monnet Professor, University of Groningen (The Netherlands), Jean 
Monnet Centre of Excellence; Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium). 
1. As a result of the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into 
force on December 1, 2009, the European Community has now disappeared, various of 
its provisions being incorporated into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. See generally Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1, corrigenda 2008 
O.J. C 111/56 & 2009 O.J. C 290/1 (entered into force Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter 
Reform Treaty]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. As to the consolidated 
versions of the Treaty on European Union [hereafter TEU], with the accompanying 
Protocols (some of which are protocols to the TEU and TFEU, and some also to the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (consolidated version 2010 
O.J. C84/12, corrigenda 2010 O.J. C 181/1)), Annexes, and Declarations attached to the 
Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, 
2010 O.J. C 83/13; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 2006 O.J. C 321E/37 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Since December 1, 2009, the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities is now known as the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (“ECJ”). Reform Treaty, supra, art. 1, 2009 O.J. C 306/01, at 16. 
2. See, e.g., Laurence Gormley, Obituary: Gordon Slynn (1930-2009), 34 EUR. L. REV. 
347, 347–48 (2009); Louis Blom-Coomper, Obituary: Lord Slynn of Hadley: Liberal Law 
Lord, Judge and Advocate General of the European Court of Justice, GUARDIAN (London), May 
22, 2009, at 41; Lord Slynn of Hadley: a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, TIMES (London), Apr. 9, 
2009, at 67; Obituary of Lord Slynn of Hadley Law: Lord and Staunch Europhile who Dissented 
from the Decision to Extradite General Pinochet, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 8, 2009, 
at 37. 
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remember his various visits to Groningen, many hilarious meals 
together, and his wise counsel and encouragement. The 
dedication of this special issue of this Journal to him justly pays 
further tribute to a great lawyer, judge, and tireless worker in 
national, European, and international law circles for the rule of 
law, respect for human rights and dignity, and liberation from all 
forms of oppression and injustice. 
TRIA JUNCTA IN UNO 
Shortly before the disappearance of the European 
Community,3 the ECJ handed down three judgments on the free 
movement of goods relating to the use to which goods are put. 
They are remarkable because they put an end to a serious 
controversy about the scope of what is now article 34 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
(article 28 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(“EC Treaty”)),4 which saw a considerable divergence in 
approach between the advocates general concerned in these 
cases. They also surely herald an end to attempts to expand the 
ambit of the now notorious judgment in Criminal Proceedings 
against Keck & Mithouard.5 These cases and their wider 
implications for the future scope of article 34 TFEU (article 28 
EC) are the subject of this Article, but, before examining these 
cases, some scene-setting seems appropriate. Regular readers of 
this Journal will recall the present author’s recent extensive 
 
3. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The last consolidated version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Communities was published in 2006, see EC Treaty, 
supra note 1, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, but it did not take account of the accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania on January 1, 2007. See Treaty of Accession, 2005 O.J. L 157/11; Act of 
Accession, 2005 O.J. L 157/203. 
4. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 34, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 35; EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 
28, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 52. 
5. Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, 
[1993] E.C.R. I-6097. Various Member States have frequently attempted to argue that 
the approach in Keck to selling arrangements should be extended from what is now 
article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC) to the other freedoms. See, e.g., Alpine Invs. BV v. 
Minister van Financiën, Case C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-1141, ¶¶ 36–39; Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-4921, ¶¶ 
102–03. 
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discussion on the free movement of goods,6 so a brief exposition 
of classic areas of controversy will suffice. 
Traditionally, academic debate on the free movement of 
goods—and on articles 34–36 TFEU (articles 28–30 EC) in 
particular—has centered on matters such as the scope of the 
term “measures having equivalent effect”; whether 
discrimination is necessary in order to find a prohibited effect; 
whether equally-applicable measures are caught by articles 34–36 
TFEU (articles 28–30 EC); the requirement of an interstate 
element; the nature of the ECJ’s approach in Keck; the nature of 
the case-law-based justifications for obstacles to the free 
movement of goods; whether the ECJ was correct to treat 
measures applicable without distinction as to the destination of 
the goods concerned as usually not caught by article 35 TFEU 
(article 29 EC); whether the case-law-based justifications and the 
justifications under article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC) should be 
assimilated; and the manner in which the ECJ approaches issues 
such as the proportionality of obstacles to trade between Member 
States which Member States argue are justified. Of these issues, 
three are directly involved in these cases on use, namely: scope, 
justification, and proportionality. 
The ECJ clearly thought that it had settled the issue of the 
scope of the term “measures having equivalent effect” with the 
classic definition in the basic principle in Dassonville: “All trading 
rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”7 That basic principle was 
tempered by the development of case-law-based justifications for 
 
6. See generally Laurence W. Gormley, Silver Threads Among the Gold . . . 50 Years of 
the Free Movement of Goods, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1637 (2008). 
7. See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, ¶ 9. As was 
noted in my previous Article, the basic principle has remained steadfast, even though 
“the reference to ‘trading rules’ is sometimes omitted, or replaced by ‘national rules’ or 
simply ‘rules[.]’” Gormley, supra note 6, at 1647. It is trite law that rules or other 
measures adopted by national, regional, or local authorities are caught, as are measures 
adopted by bodies for whose acts under European Union law the Member State 
concerned is responsible (including public bodies and public-owned/directed 
companies): the state is the state in all its manifestations, whether acting as market 
regulator or market participant. 
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such measures, in addition to the treaty-based justifications.8 
Rapidly it became apparent that lawyers were seeking to stretch 
the ambit of “measures having equivalent effect” into areas 
where the integrationist merit was thin, to say the least, or wholly 
non-existent.9 The judgment in Keck was a misconceived, albeit 
perhaps understandable, judicial reaction to the feeling of being 
constantly pushed by lawyers eager to score every point possible. 
It represented a nuancing of the application hitherto of 
Dassonville, but not a departure from it. As is well known, the 
flood of cases continued unabated, and the ECJ has often been 
Houdini-like in its contortions in its findings on whether or not 
the Keck conditions for removing measures from the scope of the 
Dassonville basic principle are satisfied.10 
The issue of whether or not to assimilate the case-law-based 
justifications is one on which the overwhelming majority of 
authors are agreed: this is not something which should happen.11 
There has been no pressure to add to the list of justifications 
contained in article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC). The initial 
confusion caused by the inclusion of the protection of public 
health in the examples of “mandatory requirements” (case-law-
based justifications) in Cassis de Dijon12 has now been cleared 
up13: the protection of public health falls under the protection of 
health and life of humans in article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC).14 
However, it can be argued that some safety matters which the ECJ 
now seems to treat as separate case-law-based justifications, i.e., 
road safety,15 shipping safety,16 and product safety,17 could equally 
 
8. For a summarization of this development, see Gormley, supra note 6, 1647, 
1679–87. 
9. See id. at 1648–60. 
10. See id. at 1660–77. 
11. Contra PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 216 (2003) (accepting that the majority of writers do not share his view). 
12. See Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, ¶ 8. 
13. See Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA v. Departmento de Sanidad y 
Seguridad Social de la Generaliteit de Cataluña, Joined Cases C-1 & 176/90, [1991] 
E.C.R. I-4151, ¶¶ 9–13. 
14. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 36, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 35; EC Treaty, supra note 1, 
art. 30, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 53. 
15. A number of cases have dealt with roadworthiness tests. See, e.g., Commission v. 
Netherlands, Case C-297/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-7467; Cura Anlagen GmBH v. Auto Service 
Leasing GmbH, Case C-451/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-3193; Sneller’s Auto’s BV v. Algemeen 
Directeur van de Dienst Wegenverkeer, Case C-314/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-8633; Criminal 
  
2010] FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 1593 
well be brought under the protection of the health and life of 
humans, and thus, in relation to goods, under article 36 TFEU 
(article 30 EC).18 The merit of a separate approach is that a clear 
distinction is drawn between more classic health and life issues 
and specific safety issues. This view only strengthens the 
argument that the case-law-based justifications and the treaty-
based justifications, although they have certain characteristics in 
common, are and should remain distinct. As is well known, the 
ECJ has consistently refused to add to the list of treaty-based 
justifications.19 
The proportionality of measures is a matter in which the ECJ 
can exercise a great deal of discretion; this has usually resulted in 
the conclusion that the national measures concerned are 
unjustified. Although the ECJ frequently seems to merge the 
question whether it is necessary to protect a given interest or 
value with the question whether the measures adopted for that 
purpose are proportionate, they logically remain separate issues, 
and there are plenty of examples of the ECJ mentioning them 
 
Proceedings against Van Schaaik, Case C-55/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-4837; Schloh v. Auto 
contrôle technique SPRL, Case 50/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1855. More directly concerned 
with road safety requirements as such are two cases discussed in the present Article: 
Commission v. Portugal, Case C-265/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245; Commission v. Italy, Case 
C-110/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-519. 
16. See Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v. Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, Case C-
18/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-1783, ¶¶ 16–36 (although this case deals with the freedom to 
provide services rather than the free movement of goods). 
17. See, e.g., A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl v. Suomen valtio and Tarmo Lehtinen, Case C-
470/03, [2007] E.C.R. I-2749; Criminal Proceedings against Yonemoto, Case C-40/04, 
[2005] E.C.R. I-7755; Commission v. France, Case 188/84, [1986] E.C.R. 419. 
18. In relation to the freedom to provide services, the most analogous provision is 
article 62 TFEU (article 55 EC) (which applies article 52(1) TFEU to the provision of 
services), which accepts measures for the protection of public health as a legitimate limit 
on the freedom to provide services. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 62, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 71; 
EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 55, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 63. For services, therefore, it 
indeed seems more appropriate to treat safety issues as case-law-based justifications. This 
may explain why the ECJ has decided to treat safety issues as case-law-based justifications 
in relation to the free movement of goods, even though the term “health and life of 
humans” in article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC) is broad enough to embrace safety issues. 
TFEU, supra note 1, art. 36, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 35; EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 30, 2006 
O.J. C 321 E, at 51. 
19. For examples of the ECJ’s rejection of treaty-based justifications such as the 
interests or values expressed in the first sentence of article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC), see 
Commission v. Ireland, Case 113/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1625, ¶ 5; Bauhuis v. Netherlands, 
Case 46/76, [1977] E.C.R. 5, ¶¶ 12–13; Commission v. Italy, Case 7/68, [1968] E.C.R. 
423, 430. 
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separately.20 The view which the ECJ has taken on 
proportionality, particularly in relation to the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services, has 
sometimes been controversial,21 although the ECJ is also used to 
dealing with matters in which emotions run high in the area of 
the free movement of goods.22 
All of these three aspects feature in the trio of spectacular 
cases on the use of goods,23 which form the subject-matter of this 
 
20. See LAURENCE GORMLEY, EU LAW OF FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND CUSTOMS 
UNION 507 (2009); Gormley, supra note 6, at 1637, 1679–80. 
21. See, e.g., Int’l Transp. Worker’s Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-10,779 (dealing with the right of establishment and industrial action); 
Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-341/05, [2007] 
E.C.R. I-1167 (dealing with the freedom to provide services and industrial action). As to 
barriers to the free movement of goods caused by unrest, see Eugen Schmidberger, 
Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659; 
Commission v. France, Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-6959 (inadequate police response 
to angry farmers); see also the notification and consultation obligations imposed by 
Council Regulation on Free Movement of Goods, No. 2679/98, art. 5, 1998 O.J. L 
337/8, at 9; see generally Giovanni Orlandini, The Free Movement of Goods as a Possible 
“Community” Limitation on Industrial Conflict, 6 EUR. L.J. 341 (2000). 
22. See, e.g., Belgium v. Spain, Case C-388/95, [2000] E.C.R. I-3123 (bottling 
requirements in region of origin for Rioja wine); The Queen v. Minister of Agric., 
Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion in World Farming Ltd., Case C-1/96, [1998] 
E.C.R. I-1251 (export of live veal calves); Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
Case 178/4, [1987] E.C.R. 1227 (quality standards for beer); see also Criminal 
Proceedings against Zoni, Case 90/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4233, ¶ 28 (pasta made from 
durum wheat); Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Glocken GmbH v. U.S.L. Centro-
Sud, Case 407/85, [1988] E.C.R. 4233. 
23. The ECJ had considered prohibitions of use in earlier judgments, but in 
specific contexts which did not require consideration of a general approach to 
restrictions on use. Thus, the Court of Justice upheld a general prohibition in Sweden 
on the industrial use of trichloroethylene because of the health and life of humans 
justification, noting that the Swedish system of individual exemptions was proportionate. 
Kemikalieinspektionen v. Toolex Alpha AB, Case C-473/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-5681, ¶ 49. 
The ECJ also examined an Austrian prohibition of lorries of more than seven-and-a-half 
tons, carrying certain goods, from being driven along certain motorway routes. 
Commission v. Austria, Case C-320/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-9871, ¶ 1. The court found that 
the prohibition of traffic, which forced transport undertakings to seek at very short 
notice viable alternative solutions for the transport of the goods concerned, was capable 
of limiting trading opportunities between northern Europe and the north of Italy; the 
alleged environmental justification (improvement of air quality) was rejected as being 
disproportionate: 
  Without the need for the Court itself to give a ruling on the existence of 
alternative means, by rail or road, of transporting the goods covered by the 
contested regulation under economically acceptable conditions, or to 
determine whether other measures, combined or not, could have been 
adopted in order to attain the objective of reducing emissions of pollutants in 
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Article. It is convenient, because the chronology of the opinions 
and the judgments is so staggered, to examine and contrast first 
the approach of the Advocates General in each case 
chronologically and then the judgments in the order handed 
down, before turning to draw conclusions for the state of the law 
relating to the future application of the judgment in Keck. 
I. THREE CASES, FOUR ADVOCATES GENERAL 
The first of these cases to receive the attention of an 
Advocate General was Commission v. Italy,24 which dealt with the 
 
the zone concerned, it suffices to say in this respect that, before adopting a 
measure so radical as a total traffic ban on a section of motorway constituting a 
vital route of communication between certain Member States, the Austrian 
authorities were under a duty to examine carefully the possibility of using 
measures less restrictive of freedom of movement, and discount them only if 
their inadequacy, in relation to the objective pursued, was clearly established. 
  More particularly, given the declared objective of transferring 
transportation of the goods concerned from road to rail, those authorities 
were required to ensure that there was sufficient and appropriate rail capacity 
to allow such a transfer before deciding to implement a measure such as that 
laid down by the contested regulation. 
  As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraph 113 of his Opinion, 
it has not been conclusively established in this case that the Austrian 
authorities, in preparing the contested regulation, sufficiently studied the 
question whether the aim of reducing pollutant emissions could be achieved 
by other means less restrictive of the freedom of movement and whether there 
actually was a realistic alternative for the transportation of the affected goods 
by other means of transport or via other road routes. 
  Moreover, a transition period of only two months between the date on 
which the contested regulation was adopted and the date fixed by the Austrian 
authorities for implementation of the sectoral traffic ban was clearly 
insufficient reasonably to allow the operators concerned to adapt to the new 
circumstances. 
Id. ¶¶ 87–90 (citations omitted). The ECJ thus concentrated on the effect on the 
transportation of the goods rather than on the use of the lorries as such. 
24. Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, 
[2006] E.C.R. 519. This opinion was delivered in unusual circumstances: as neither of 
the parties had requested an oral hearing (which is unusual in infringement 
proceedings), the case proceeded straight to the Advocate General’s opinion. While the 
hearing in Åklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos, Case C-142/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, was 
held on July 13, 2006, Mr. Léger was the first Advocate General to pronounce in the 
series of cases under discussion. Having heard his opinion, the Third Chamber of the 
ECJ decided on November 9, 2006 to remit the case in Commission v. Italy to the Grand 
Chamber, which by order of March 7, 2007 (transcript available in French on the ECJ’s 
website) reopened the oral procedure to enable it to hear observations presented by the 
parties and eight other Member States at a hearing on May 22, 2007. Advocate General 
Bot was invited to present an opinion to the Grand Chamber, which he duly did on July 
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prohibition in Italy of the towing of trailers by mopeds. Advocate 
General Léger had absolutely no difficulty in concluding that this 
rule—which was equally applicable to domestic and imported 
trailers registered in Italy alike—fell within the scope of what is 
now article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC): 
 [I]t is undeniable that, by imposing a general and absolute 
prohibition on the towing of trailers by mopeds throughout 
Italian territory, the national rules at issue impede the free 
movement of goods and, in particular, that of trailers. 
 Although that prohibition relates only to mopeds, it seems 
to me that the coupling of a trailer to a vehicle of that kind 
constitutes a normal and frequently used means of transport, 
particularly in rural areas. However, those rules, although 
not prohibiting imports of trailers and their marketing in 
Italy, have the effect of limiting their use throughout Italian 
territory. I am therefore of the opinion that such a 
prohibition is liable to limit opportunities for trade between 
the Italian Republic and the other Member States and to 
hamper imports and the marketing in Italy of trailers from 
those States, even though they are lawfully manufactured and 
marketed there. 
 In those circumstances, it seems to me that the national 
rules at issue constitute a measure having an effect 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction, in principle 
prohibited by Article 28 EC.25 
Mr. Léger then turned to any possible justification. He 
acknowledged that road safety—as an aspect of public safety and 
the health and life of humans26—could be a legitimate ground 
 
8, 2008. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-519. 
25. Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Commission v. Italy, [2006] E.C.R. 519, ¶¶ 
39–41. 
26. Advocate General Léger was clearly meaning safety in the sense of public 
security (in various EU languages, the English words “safety” and “security” are largely 
covered by the same word), although the ECJ seems to regard public security as being 
something different. Id. The cases so far deal with matters such as safeguarding the 
institutions of a Member State, its essential public services and the survival of its 
inhabitants, internal and external security, and controls on the importation and 
exportation of goods such as firearms, explosives, and the like. See Frits Werner-
Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v. Germany, Case C-70/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-3189, ¶ 25; 
Criminal Proceedings against Leifer, Case C-83/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-3231, ¶ 26; Criminal 
Proceedings against Richardt & Les Accessores Scientifiques SNC, Case C-367/89, 
[1991] E.C.R. I-4621, ¶ 22; see also GORMLEY, supra note 20, at 463. See generally 
Commission v. Greece, Case C-347/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-4747; Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister 
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for upholding the measures27: indeed, coupling a trailer to a 
moped could, in certain circumstances, constitute a danger to 
traffic insofar as such vehicles are slow and encroach significantly 
upon the carriageway. He could well imagine that vehicular 
traffic of that kind may be limited on certain roads, such as 
motorways and particularly dangerous roads. However, the 
Italian authorities had not produced any precise factor which 
demonstrated how the ban contributed to road safety; it was clear 
that the ban only applied to mopeds registered in Italy, and not 
to foreign-registered mopeds with trailers. It was also evident that 
the safety of drivers pursued by the rules at issue could be 
guaranteed by measures less restrictive of intra-Community trade, 
for example, by localized prohibitions, applicable to itineraries 
that are considered dangerous, such as Alpine crossings or 
particularly heavily used public highways.28 Mr Léger went on to 
observe that Italy’s stated intention to amend its rules to conform 
with Community law confirmed that analysis,29 and that it was, in 
any event, incumbent upon the Italian authorities to consider 
carefully, before adopting a measure as radical as a general and 
absolute prohibition, whether it might be possible to resort to 
measures less restrictive of freedom of movement and to rule 
them out only if their unsuitability for attainment of the aim 
pursued was clearly established.30 
Advocate General Léger’s analysis follows a classical 
Dassonville approach, considering first that there is clearly a 
barrier to trade between Member States, and then proceeding to 
deal with the alleged justification.31 As has already been noted, 
the case was subsequently referred to the Grand Chamber of the 
ECJ for further consideration after another opinion from 
Advocate General Bot,32 but in order to follow the chronological 
 
for Indus. and Energy, Case 72/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2727. In any event, it is clear that he 
envisaged road safety as falling within the fields covered by the first sentence of what is 
now article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC). 
27. Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Commission v. Italy, [2006] E.C.R. 519, ¶¶ 
43–46. 
28. See id. ¶ 59. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. ¶ 60. 
31. See Gormley, supra note 6, at 1657. 
32. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Commission v. Italy, [2009] E.C.R. I-519. 
The case was referred to the Grand Chamber in order to permit observations to be 
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order of the opinions given, it is appropriate to return to Mr. 
Bot’s opinion presently below. 
Chronologically the first of these cases actually to have an 
oral hearing, but second in terms of delivery of an opinion, is 
Åklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos.33 This concerned a prosecution in 
Sweden for having driven personal watercraft on August 8, 2004, 
on waters where the use of personal watercraft was not 
permitted;34 the defendants relied on, inter alia, articles 28 and 
30 EC (articles 34 and 36 TFEU). Advocate General Kokott 
proposed that the ECJ exclude arrangements for the use of 
goods from the scope of the basic principle in Dassonville,35 and 
thus from article 28 EC (article 34 TFEU), in the same way as it 
had excluded certain selling arrangements in Keck36 in response 
to the increasing tendency of traders to invoke article 28 EC 
(article 34 TFEU) to challenge any rule whose effect was to limit 
their commercial freedom, even where such rules were not 
aimed at products from other Member States.37 She noted that at 
present, in the context of arrangements for use, ultimately 
individuals could even invoke article 28 EC (article 34 TFEU) to 
challenge national rules whose effect is merely to limit their 
general freedom of action.38 She took the view that national 
legislation which laid down arrangements for the use of products 
did not constitute a measure having equivalent effect within the 
meaning of article 28 EC (article 34 TFEU) so long as it applied 
to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and 
so long as it affected in the same manner, in law and in fact, the 
marketing of domestic products and of those from other 
Member States, and was not product-related.39 In order to 
 
presented to the ECJ, as none had been presented initially; the Advocate General was 
then able to take account of the observations. 
33. See Åklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos, Case C-142/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-4273. 
Hearing was held July 13, 2006, but the opinion was delivered December 14, 2006 and 
the judgment was rendered June 4, 2009. See id. 
34. See id. ¶¶ 14–15. Use was permitted on general navigable waterways and on 
other waters where permission had been granted. See id. ¶¶ 1–13. The ban on use was 
thus not total, but location-specific. See id. 
35. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837. 
36. Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 
268/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097. 
37. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Mickelsson & Roos, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273. 
38. See id. ¶ 48. 
39. See id. ¶ 49. 
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support her view, she mentioned two extreme examples: a 
prohibition on driving cross-country vehicles off-road in forests, 
and speed limits on motorways.40 These, she felt, would also 
constitute a measure having equivalent effect: it could be argued 
that they possibly deter people from purchasing a cross-country 
vehicle or a particularly fast car because they could not use them 
as they wish, and the restriction on use thus constituted a 
potential hindrance for intra-Community trade.41 However, she 
concluded that prohibitions on use or national legislation that 
permitted only a marginal use for a product, insofar as they 
(virtually) prevented access to the market for the product, would 
constitute measures having equivalent effect which are 
prohibited under article 28 EC (article 34 TFEU), unless they 
were justified under article 30 EC (article 36 TFEU) or by an 
imperative public interest.42 
With respect to the learned Advocate General, her examples 
of the (equally-applicable) prohibition of off-road driving and 
speed limits on motorways really are very old canards: they fail to 
meet the criteria for measures having equivalent effect because 
they are so remote from intra-Community trade as to have 
nothing to do with it in reality—the integrationist merit is thin 
beyond belief.43 This is the case even though the concept of 
measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction is 
undoubtedly an effects doctrine rather than an intent-based 
doctrine.44 And even if it could be argued that they were caught 
under the basic principle in Dassonville, public policy, road safety, 
and environmental considerations would be such obvious 
 
40. See id. ¶ 45. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. ¶ 87. She also concluded that national rules that laid down a prohibition 
on using personal watercraft in waters, in respect of which the county administrative 
boards had not yet decided whether environmental protection requires a prohibition on 
use there, were disproportionate, and therefore not justified unless they included a 
reasonable deadline by which the county administrative boards had to have taken the 
relevant decisions. See id. 
43. The argument that the measures concerned had in reality nothing to do with 
intra-Community trade was spectacularly used by the ECJ in Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 
75/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1211, and H. Krantz GmbH & Co. v. Ontvanger der Directe 
Belastingen, Case C-69/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-583. 
44. See, e.g., Deutscher Apothekerverbund eV v. 0800 Doc Morris NV, Case C-
222/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-14,887, ¶ 67; Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media 
AG, Case C-244/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-505, ¶ 27. 
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justifications that the argument is simply not worth running. The 
learned Advocate General’s observation that only marginal use 
for a product resulting from of a virtually total prohibition of 
market access would be enough to prevent the market access 
concept inherent in the second of the famous conditions in Keck 
for taking certain selling arrangements outside the scope of 
article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC) from being satisfied was at least a 
step in the right direction.45 It would indeed be for the national 
court to ascertain whether this was the case. 
The next Advocate General to pronounce was Ms. Trstenjak 
in Commission v. Portugal in an opinion that is a model of 
excellent analysis.46 This case dealt with a national rule 
prohibiting the attachment of colored foil to the windows of 
motor vehicles for the transport of persons or goods.47 Here the 
issue was more straightforwardly concerned with the product as 
such. The learned Advocate General had little difficulty in 
finding that this meant that colored foil, which was lawfully 
produced or marketed in other Member States, could not in 
effect be bought in Portugal: Portuguese drivers would be 
deterred from buying the foil because it was illegal to apply it to 
their windscreens; if it could not be used, there was an obstacle to 
it being imported and marketed.48 
The Portuguese government had advanced two 
justifications: the need to combat crime and the requirements of 
road safety, since it made it easier to verify that the vehicle seats 
were correctly occupied and that safety belts were being used as 
 
45. The first condition was that the state rules concerned apply to all relevant 
traders operating within the national territory; the second was that they affect in the 
same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of products 
from other Member States. Provided that those conditions were fulfilled, the ECJ 
concluded that there would be no prevention of access to the market or impediment to 
access for foreign products any more that there was an impediment to access for 
domestic products. See Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases 
C-267 & 268/91, [1993] E.C.R. 6097, ¶ 16. There are several cases that exemplify the 
ECJ’s willingness to examine total state barriers to market access. See, e.g., Douwe 
Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV et al., Case C-239/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7007, ¶¶ 48–
59; Konsumentenombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int’l Products AB, Case C-405/98, [2002] 
E.C.R. I-1795, ¶¶ 13–34; Konsumentenombudsmannen v. De Agnostini (Swenska) 
Förlag AB, Joined Cases C-34–36/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3843, ¶¶ 32–35. 
46. Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Commission v. Portugal, Case C-
256/06 [2008], E.C.R. I-2245. 
47. See id. ¶ 1. 
48. See id. ¶ 24. 
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required by the law.49 The prohibition was imposed in order to 
ensure that it was possible to inspect the interior of the motor 
vehicle from outside.50 The aim was not to achieve reasonably 
clear visibility for the driver by preserving the light transmission 
of the window, but to allow the competent authorities to verify 
directly that road traffic legislation was being complied with 
simply by observing motor vehicles and their occupants.51 Ms. 
Trstenjak found these arguments deeply unconvincing: no 
evidence had been adduced of a sufficiently serious present 
threat to a fundamental interest of society so as to constitute a 
threat to public policy in Portugal.52 Regarding road safety, she 
found that facilitating the ease of checks was indeed an 
appropriate method of contributing to road safety, but 
concluded that the measure was disproportionate: there was a 
lack of evidence that the prohibition on the use of tinted film 
contributed to road safety—all the more so since the use of 
tinted glass was not prohibited!53 Moreover, it would have been 
possible for Portugal to have made provisions permitting the 
attachment of foil provided that the European minimum light 
transmission requirements were observed.54 In this product-based 
scenario, Keck arguments, of course, played no part. 
 
49. See id. ¶ 29. 
50. See id. ¶ 47. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. ¶ 51. 
53. See id. ¶¶ 54–57. 
54. See id. ¶ 62. Member States could require, on the basis of Commission Directive 
No. 2001/92, that the minimum light transmission of glazing ahead of the B-pillar be 
seventy percent and on the windshield be seventy-five percent. 2001 O.J. L 291/24, at 25. 
The Advocate General observed that this would “ultimately amount to a restriction of 
the prohibition” under review so that “only the use of film which cannot guarantee the 
observance of the prescribed limit values because of insufficient light transmission may 
be prohibited.” See Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Portugal, [2008] E.C.R. I-
2245, ¶ 63. In addition, the learned Advocate General observed that a further spatial 
restriction of the prohibition to glazing which actually allowed the police to monitor 
road traffic would be appropriate. She noted: 
This would extend both to the windscreen of a motor vehicle and to the 
glazing alongside the seats of the occupants of the vehicle, but not to the rear 
windscreen. Not only would this allow the police to check the occupants of 
vehicles through observation alone, but such a measure would also have no 
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The final opinion to be considered is that of Advocate 
General Bot, presented when Commission v. Italy was transferred 
to the Grand Chamber of the ECJ.55 When the oral procedure 
was re-opened, the Grand Chamber asked the parties and all the 
other Member States to give their views on: 
[T]he question of the extent to which and the conditions 
under which national provisions which govern not the 
characteristics of goods but their use, and which apply 
without distinction to domestic and imported goods, are to 
be regarded as measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of 
Article 28 EC.56 
Apart from the parties, eight other Member States submitted 
observations on this question.57 Mr. Bot came to the conclusion 
that national measures governing conditions for the use of goods 
should not be examined in the light of the criteria laid down by 
the Court in Keck; he felt that “such measures f[e]ll within the 
scope of Article 28 EC and may constitute measures having an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions . . . if they hinder 
access to the market for the product concerned.”58 Mr. Bot gave 
several reasons for this view. 
First, he submitted that such a course of action would result 
in the introduction of a new category of exemption from the 
application of article 28 EC (article 34 TFEU); this would be 
undesirable for a number of reasons.59 He was unsure whether 
“the reasons which prompted the Court to exclude from the 
scope of Article 28 EC rules on selling arrangements for products 
also exist[ed] in the case of rules governing arrangements for 
use.”60 Drawing distinctions between different categories of rules 
was inappropriate—it was artificial and could be a source of 
confusion for the national courts. Furthermore, to “exclude from 
the scope of Article 28 EC national rules governing not only 
 
55. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] 
E.C.R. I-519. 
56. See id. ¶ 6. 
57. See id. (these countries were Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden). 
58. Id. ¶ 11. 
59. See id. ¶ 88. 
60. Id. ¶ 89. Mr. Bot noted that there had not been a large number of cases 
brought to the ECJ on the use of goods. See id. 
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selling arrangements for goods but also arrangements for their 
use was contrary to the Treaty’s objectives, namely the creation of 
a single and integrated market.”61 In his view, “such a solution 
would undermine the useful effect of Article 28 EC, since it 
would once more make it possible for Member States to legislate 
in areas which, on the contrary, the legislature wished to 
“communitarize.”62 That was “not the course that European 
construction and the creation of a single European market 
should follow.”63 He opined further that “[a] product must be 
able to move, unhindered, within the common market, and 
national measures which, in whatever way, create an obstacle to 
intra-Community trade must be ones that the Member States can 
justify.”64 
Mr. Bot’s second reason was that there was no interest in 
limiting the Court’s review of measures which, in fact, may 
constitute a serious obstacle to intra-Community trade.65 He 
regarded “[t]he judicial review carried out by the Court in 
accordance with the ‘traditional analytical pattern’ laid down in 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon” as “fully satisfactory” and saw no 
reason to depart from it.66 “That analytical approach not only 
ma[de] it possible for the Court to monitor Member States’ 
compliance with Treaty provisions,” but it also allowed the 
Member States a certain leeway.67 The classic approach of the 
wide basic principle accompanied by a strict interpretation of the 
treaty-based justifications and the use of the case-law-based 
justifications ensured that liberalization of trade did not affect 
the pursuit of other general interests.68 At the same time this did 
not give a carte blanche to the Member States, as the alleged 
justifications on these public interest grounds had to pass 
through the tests of necessity and proportionality.69 This 
analytical approach enabled the ECJ to ensure judicial review of 
 
61. Id. ¶¶ 90–91. 
62. Id. ¶ 91. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See id. ¶ 92. 
66. Id. ¶ 93. 
67. Id. ¶ 94. 
68. See id. ¶¶ 95–96. 
69. See id. ¶ 98. 
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all measures adopted by the Member States.70 Such review was, 
Advocate General Bot submitted, “necessary to make certain that 
the Member States take account of the extent to which the rules 
adopted by them [were] liable to affect the free movement of 
goods and the enjoyment of freedoms of movement by operators 
in the market,” as well as being “necessary to ensure that the 
national courts were not prompted to exclude too many 
measures from the prohibition” laid down by article 28 EC 
(article 34 TFEU).71 It was right, therefore, to view the term 
“restriction” in broad terms. At the same time, he noted that 
judicial review had to remain limited, since the ECJ’s role was 
“not systematically to challenge policing measures adopted by 
the Member States”; it was “the review of proportionality which 
enabled the Court to weigh the interests associated with 
attainment of the internal market against those relating to the 
legitimate interests of the Member States.”72 There was, he 
concluded, “no reason for departing from that analytical 
approach in favour of a solution which, ultimately, would to some 
extent render nugatory one of the key provisions of the Treaty.”73 
The third reason he advanced was that the Keck & Mithouard 
criteria “c[ould] not be extended either to rules prohibiting the 
use of a product or even to rules laying down arrangements for 
its use.”74 Insofar as the Italian rules prohibited the use of a 
product outright and thus rendered it entirely unusable, they 
constituted, by their nature, an impediment to the free 
movement of goods.75 He noted that “[e]ven if those rules 
applied in the same way to domestic and imported products, they 
prevent the latter from gaining access to the market.”76 That was 
clearly a restriction, and an examination based on the 
relationship between articles 28 and 30 EC (articles 34 and 36 
 
70. See id. ¶ 100. In making this point about the need to retain the jurisdiction to 
look at the national measures in the round (whereas when the Keck criteria are satisfied, 
the ECJ effectively ousts its jurisdiction with the result that the measures fall outside the 
scope of the prohibition in article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC)), the learned Advocate 
General silently followed the argument advanced in Laurence W. Gormley, Two Years 
after Keck, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 866, 881, 885 (1996). 
71. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Italy, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 100. 
72. Id. ¶ 101. 
73. Id. ¶ 102. 
74. Id. ¶ 103. 
75. See id. ¶ 104. 
76. Id. 
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TFEU) was appropriate.77 This also applied, he submitted, “to 
measures which lay down the arrangements for a product’s 
use.”78 He further noted: 
Even if those measures did not in principle seek to regulate 
trade in goods between Member States, they may 
nevertheless have effects on intra-Community trade by 
affecting access to the market for the product concerned. It 
is therefore, in my view, preferable to examine measures of 
that kind in the light of the Treaty rules rather than to 
remove them from the scope of the Treaty.79 
In the light of these three reasons, he concluded that the 
Keck criteria were inappropriate and that the Italian rules should 
be examined on the basis of article 28 EC (article 34 TFEU) 
using a criterion that had been developed in the light of the aim 
pursued by article 28 EC and was “common to all restrictions on 
freedom of movement, namely the criterion of access to the 
market.”80 This would be “based on the effect of the measure on 
access to the market rather than on the object of the rules 
involved.” The criterion would apply to “all types of rules, be they 
requirements relating to the characteristics of a product, selling 
arrangements or arrangements for use,” and would be “based on 
the extent to which national rules hinder trade between Member 
States.”81 Thus, “a national measure would amount to a measure 
having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, contrary 
to the Treaty, where it prevented, impeded or rendered more 
difficult access to the market for products from other Member 
States,” regardless of the aim of the measure concerned.82 On the 
basis of that criterion, “the Member States would only have to 
provide justification for measures that impeded intra-Community 
trade.”83 This, Mr. Bot argued, “would facilitate a more 
appropriate balance between requirements relating to the proper 
functioning of the common market and those relating to the 
requisite respect for the sovereign powers of the Member 
 
77. See id. 
78. See id. ¶ 105. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. ¶¶ 106–07. 
81. Id. ¶¶ 109–10. 
82. Id. ¶ 111. 
83. Id. ¶ 112. 
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States.”84 A case-by-case approach should be taken by the ECJ, 
with a specific examination of “the extent of the obstacle to intra-
Community trade caused by the measure limiting access to the 
market.”85 
On the basis of this approach, Mr. Bot then relatively quickly 
concluded that the Italian measure hindered access to the Italian 
market for trailers attached to a moped, motorcycle, tricycle or 
quadricycle.86 The prohibition made it “practically impossible to 
penetrate the Italian market”; “the extent of the prohibition was 
such that it [left] no scope for anything other than purely 
marginal use of trailers.”87 They were rendered “entirely useless 
because they could not be used for the normal purpose for which 
they were intended,” which was to increase the luggage-carrying 
capacity of a motorcycle.88 Distributors were therefore dissuaded 
from importing them if they could not be sold or rented. The 
effect of the prohibition was thus to significantly reduce 
imports.89 Given that the use of trailers was prohibited 
throughout Italian territory, there was “a substantial, direct and 
immediate obstacle to intra-Community trade.”90 
As to any possible justification, Mr. Bot was brief. The 
prohibition applied not to use in “specific localities or on 
particular itineraries, but appli[ed] throughout Italian territory, 
regardless of road infrastructure and traffic conditions.”91 No 
argument of proportionality had been advanced by the Italian 
government and, as Advocate General Léger had already 
observed, the prohibition concerned only motorcycles registered 
in Italy, so that “vehicles registered in other Member States were 
therefore authorised to tow a trailer on Italian roads.”92 Like Mr. 
Léger, Mr. Bot considered that “the driver safety sought by the 
Italian legislation could be achieved by means that restrict 
freedom of trade to a much lesser extent.”93 For example, it 
 
84. Id. 
85. Id. ¶ 113. 
86. See id. ¶¶ 147–77. 
87. Id. ¶¶ 157–58. 
88. See id. ¶ 158. 
89. See id. 
90. Id. ¶ 159. 
91. Id. ¶ 153. 
92. Id. ¶ 169. 
93. Id. ¶ 170. 
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would be appropriate, he submitted, “to define which itineraries 
in Italy [were] considered to be fraught with risks—such as 
mountain crossings, motorways or even particularly heavily used 
public highways—for the purpose of laying down sectoral 
prohibitions or limitations”; such an approach would “reduce 
the risks arising from the use of trailers and would certainly be 
less restrictive of trade.”94 Advocate General Bot furthermore 
noted that the Italian authorities were obliged to “examine 
closely, before adopting as radical a measure as a general and 
absolute prohibition, the possibility of resorting to measures less 
restrictive of freedom of movement and not to reject them unless 
it was clearly established that they were not consonant with the 
aim pursued”; such an examination had never been 
undertaken.95 
This extensive discussion of Mr. Bot’s approach is justified 
because of his clear faith in the market access approach, but it 
may be wondered quite what this adds to the basic principle in 
Dassonville,96 other than a seemingly seductive name. On the 
facts, it may be that, for example, a government-sponsored 
campaign to promote national products has actually had no 
demonstrable impact or has actually backfired, but that has not 
prevented the ECJ from holding that there is still a barrier to 
trade.97 Another disturbing aspect of Mr. Bot’s approach is how 
easily a case-by-case examination of the extent of the obstacle to 
interstate trade can descend into the introduction of a de minimis 
rule, an approach which has rightly always been rejected by the 
ECJ whenever it has reared its ugly head.98 While his observation 
 
94. Id. ¶ 170. 
95. Id. ¶ 171. 
96. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837. 
97. See, e.g., Commission v. Ireland, Case 249/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4005, ¶ 25. 
98. See, e.g., Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co. v. Land Baden-
Württemberg, Case C-309/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-11,763, ¶ 68; Commission v. Italy, Case 
103/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1759, ¶ 18; Commission v. France, Case 269/83, [1985] E.C.R. 
837, ¶¶ 10–11; Criminal Proceedings against Van der Haar, Joined Cases 177 & 178/82, 
[1984] E.C.R. 1797, ¶¶ 12–13; Criminal Proceedings against Prantl, Case 16/83, [1984] 
E.C.R. 1299, ¶¶ 20–21. Despite the invitation by Advocate General Jacobs, the ECJ has 
steadfastly held the line against a de minimis approach in article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC). 
See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Société d’Importation Édouard Leclerc-Siplec 
v. TFI Publicité, Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-179, ¶¶ 38–39, 43, 46. In Hünermund v. 
Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, Advocate General Tesauro has stated that this 
would be a “very difficult, if not downright impossible” exercise. Opinion of Advocate 
General Tesauro, Hünermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, Case 
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that the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon approaches work well is 
indeed to be welcomed, it is submitted that the apparent charms 
of his approach are full of traps for the unwary. 
The four Advocates General involved in these three cases 
produced very different approaches to the question of whether 
the rules relating to the use of goods fall within the scope of 
article 34 TFEU. Fortunately, the judgments mark a firm 
rejection of siren calls in favor of the importance of the unity of 
the internal market within the European Union. 
II. PARADISE REGAINED? 
The first of the cases under discussion to come to judgment 
was Commission v. Portugal,99 a decision of the Third Chamber of 
the ECJ. In a model of orthodox application of the basic 
principle in Dassonville,100 the ECJ noted that the Portuguese 
government admitted that the ban on tinted film restricted the 
marketing of those products in Portugal. The ECJ had no 
difficulty at all in concluding that potential customers, traders, or 
individuals had practically no interest in buying them, knowing 
that affixing such film to the windshield and windows alongside 
passenger seats in motor vehicles was prohibited.101 
The only issue remaining was whether there was any 
justification for the measure. Unsurprisingly, in view of Ms. 
Trstenjak’s clear opinion, the conclusion was that the measure 
was excessive and that the alleged justification was not 
established.102 The only argument advanced by Portugal was that 
the ban enabled the “passenger compartment of motor vehicles 
to be immediately inspected by means of simple observation from 
outside the vehicle.”103 While the Third Chamber accepted that 
the ban appeared likely to facilitate this inspection and, thus, 
appropriate to attain the objectives of fighting crime and 
 
C-292/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-6787, ¶ 21; see Giuseppe Tesauro, The Community’s Internal 
Market in the Light of the Recent Case-law of the Court of Justice, 15 Y.B. EUR. L. 1, 7 (1995). 
99. Commission v. Portugal, Case C-265/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245. 
100. Dassonville, [1974] E.C.R. 837. 
101. See Portugal, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245, ¶¶ 14–15. The only exception was in 
relation to the “goods compartment of goods vehicles and to non-wheeled vehicles.” Id. 
¶ 34. 
102. See id. ¶ 47. 
103. Id. ¶ 40. 
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ensuring road safety, it did not follow that it was necessary to 
attain those objectives or that there were no other less restrictive 
means of doing so. Visual inspection was “only one means among 
others . . . in order to fight crime and prevent offences relating to 
the obligation to wear seat belts.”104 The alleged necessity of the 
ban was only further undermined when Portugal admitted at the 
hearing that it allowed the marketing in its territory of motor 
vehicles fitted from the outset with tinted windows within the 
limits laid down by Council Directive 92/22.105 Tinted windows, 
like tinted film, may prevent any external visual inspection of the 
interior of vehicles. The ECJ pointed out that “unless it was 
accepted that, as regards motor vehicles fitted at the outset with 
tinted windows,” the Portuguese authorities had “abandoned 
their campaign to fight crime and their efforts to enforce road 
safety, it was clear that they must use other methods to identify 
criminals and persons who may be breaking the rules concerning 
the wearing of seat belts.”106 Furthermore, no evidence had been 
adduced to show “that the ban, in so far as it concerned all tinted 
film, [was] necessary to promote road safety and combat 
crime.”107 Given “that there was a wide range of tinted film, from 
transparent film to film which is almost opaque . . . at least some 
films, namely those with a sufficient degree of transparency, 
permit[ted] the desired visual inspection of the interior of motor 
vehicles.”108 For all these reasons, which closely follow the 
approach proposed by the learned Advocate General, the Third 
Chamber rightly concluded that the measure concerned was not 
justified. 
Ten months later, the Grand Chamber handed down its 
judgment in the motorcycle trailers case, Commission v Italy.109 
The judgment follows an orthodox line, as could be anticipated 
in view of the submissions of Advocate General Bot, although 
without any opening up of a de minimis possibility. The approach 
 
104. Id. ¶ 42. 
105.  Council Directive No. 92/22/EEC, On Safety Glazing and Glazing Materials 
on Motor Vehicles and Their Trailers, 1992 O.J. L 129/11, amended by Commission 
Directive No. 2001/92/EC, 2001 O.J. L 291/24. 
106. Portugal, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245, ¶ 44. 
107. Id. ¶ 45. 
108. Id. ¶ 46. 
109. Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-519. 
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is firmly grounded in Dassonville110 and Cassis de Dijon.111 The 
Grand Chamber noted that “[i]t is also apparent from settled 
case-law that Article 28 EC reflects the obligation to respect the 
principles of non-discrimination and of mutual recognition of 
products lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member 
States, as well as the principle of ensuring free access of 
Community products to national markets.”112 
The Grand Chamber cited in support of this paragraphs 
from three well-known judgments.113 While there is nothing 
wrong about this proposition as such, and although it is clearly 
illustrative and not limitative, the paragraphs cited in support 
only support partially. The first of these, in Sandoz, reads: 
 As regards the requirement of a market demand it must be 
emphasized that the sole fact of imposing such a condition 
constitutes in itself a measure having an equivalent effect to a 
quantitative restriction prohibited by Article 30 which cannot 
be covered by the exception in Article 36. The objective 
pursued by the principle of free movement of goods is 
precisely to ensure for products from the various Member 
States access to markets on which they were not previously 
represented.114 
The second part of this quotation clearly supports the 
second part of the Grand Chamber’s proposition set out above. 
The paragraphs relied upon from Cassis de Dijon,115 however, 
were not carefully selected. Paragraph 6 of that judgment lends 
no support at all to the Grand Chamber’s proposition; it merely 
states what assistance the national court was asking from the 
ECJ.116 Paragraph 14 first states that the German rules did not 
“serve a purpose which [was] in the general interest and such as 
to take precedence over the free movement of goods”;117 it then 
 
110. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837. 
111. Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649. 
112. Id. ¶ 34. 
113. See id. (citing Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases 
C-267 & 268/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶¶ 16–17; Criminal Proceedings against Sandoz 
BV, Case 174/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2445, ¶ 26; Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 
649, ¶¶ 6, 14, 15). 
114. Sandoz, [1983] E.C.R. 2445, ¶ 26. The article numbers referred to are now 
articles 34 and 36 TFEU respectively. 
115. Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649. 
116. Id. ¶ 6. 
117. Id. ¶ 14. 
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notes that the principal effect of the requirement of a minimum 
alcohol percentage was to exclude from the German market 
products of other Member States which had a lower alcohol 
content. It then draws the conclusion that there was an obstacle 
to trade, and finishes with the statement that: 
 There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they 
have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the 
Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be 
introduced into any other Member State; the sale of such 
products may not be subject to a legal prohibition on the 
marketing of beverages with an alcohol content lower than 
the limit set by the national rules.”118 
As is well-known, this paragraph makes the famous mistake 
of using the term “lawfully produced and marketed” instead of 
“lawfully produced or marketed” that the scheme of free 
movement within the European Union requires.119 The final 
paragraph adduced from Cassis de Dijon, paragraph 15, simply 
states the conclusion that where the importation of alcoholic 
beverages lawfully produced and marketed in another Member 
State is concerned, the fixing of a minimum alcohol content 
constituted a measure having equivalent effect.120 Thus, one of 
the three paragraphs cited is irrelevant, the third states the 
conclusion in the judgment, and the second lays the embryonic 
foundation of the principle of mutual recognition of goods.121 
The last judgment cited in support of the proposition is Keck 
itself.122 Paragraphs 16 and 17 of that judgment set out the 
celebrated two tests which the Court said, if met, would take 
 
118. Id. 
119. The present writer has pointed this out on many occasions. See, e.g., Gormley, 
supra note 6, at 1649–50. The only explanation might be that the facts concerned goods 
lawfully produced and marketed in France, and that nobody thought about goods 
produced outside the (then) European Economic Community and lawfully marketed 
within a Member State, which then were exported into another Member State. 
120. Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649, ¶ 15. 
121. See Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences of 
the judgment given by the Court of Justice on February 20, 1979 in Cassis de Dijon, Case 
120/78, 1980 O.J. C 256/2; see also René Barents, New Developments in Measures Having 
Equivalent Effect, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 271, 296 (1981). See generally Laurence 
Gormley, Cassis de Dijon and the Communication from the Commission, 6 EUR. L. REV. 454 
(1981). 
122. See Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 
268/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097. 
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certain rules governing selling arrangements outside the scope of 
article 30 EC (article 36 TFEU) and express the market access 
approach.123 
Returning to the Grand Chamber’s approach in Commission 
v. Italy, the Court repeated the conclusion from Cassis de Dijon: 
[I]n the absence of harmonisation of national legislation, 
obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the 
consequence of applying, to goods coming from other 
Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and 
marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by 
such goods constitute measures of equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions even if those rules apply to all 
products alike.”124 
It then simply trotted out paragraphs 16 and 17 of Keck 
before concluding: 
 Consequently, measures adopted by a Member State the 
object or effect of which is to treat products coming from 
other Member States less favourably are to be regarded as 
measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
on imports within the meaning of Article 28 EC, as are the 
measures referred to in paragraph 35 of the present 
judgment. Any other measure which hinders access of 
products originating in other Member States to the market 
of a Member State is also covered by that concept.125 
Clearly, there was no prospect of measures relating to the 
use of goods being taken outside the scope of article 34 TFEU 
(article 28 EC). Orthodoxy was maintained and the line was held. 
 
123. See id. ¶¶ 16–17. 
124. Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 35 (citations 
omitted). Again the Grand Chamber referred in paragraph 35 to paragraphs 6, 14, and 
15 of Cassis de Dijon. See id. ¶ 35. While this is a correct statement of the result of Cassis de 
Dijon, the wording as such does not occur in the judgment in Cassis de Dijon! The Grand 
Chamber also referred to Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH 
v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3689, ¶ 8, and to Deutscher 
Apothekerverbund eV v. 0800 Doc Morris, Case C-322/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-14,887, ¶ 67. 
See Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 35. These two paragraphs merely restate 
paragraph 15 of Keck with the addition in Doc Morris of the sentence, “Even if a measure 
is not intended to regulate trade in goods between Member States, the determining 
factor is its effect, actual or potential on intra-Community trade.” See Doc Morris, [2003] 
E.C.R. I-14,887, ¶ 67. 
125. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 37. The measures referred to in 
paragraph 35 are those set out in the preceding quotation. See supra note 124. 
  
2010] FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 1613 
The Grand Chamber then went on to look at whether there 
was indeed an obstacle to intra-Community trade.126 It noted that 
the Commission had not drawn a distinction between trailers 
specially designed to be towed by motorcycles and those not so 
specifically designed.127 In relation to the latter, it concluded that 
the Commission had failed to establish that the Italian 
prohibition hindered access to the Italian market for that type of 
trailer.128 In respect of the trailers specially designed for towing 
by motorcycles, the Grand Chamber noted that the Commission 
had stated, without being contradicted by the Italian 
government, that “the possibilities for their use other than with 
motorcycles are very limited”; the Commission had argued that, 
“although it [was] not inconceivable that they could, in certain 
circumstances, be towed by other vehicles, in particular, by 
automobiles, such use was inappropriate and remained at least 
insignificant, if not hypothetical.”129 The Grand Chamber noted 
that “a prohibition on the use of a product in the territory of a 
Member State ha[d] a considerable influence on the behaviour 
of consumers, which, in its turn, affect[ed] the access of that 
product to the market of that Member State.”130 Thus, 
“[c]onsumers, knowing that they were not permitted to use their 
motorcycle with a trailer specially designed for it, ha[d] 
practically no interest in buying such a trailer”131 The contested 
Italian measure thus “prevent[ed] a demand from existing in the 
market at issue for such trailers and therefore hinder[ed] their 
importation.”132 
Thus far, the judgment is coherent in its approach. Then 
logical reasoning disappears and the Grand Chamber defers to 
the Italian arguments wholesale, almost giving the appearance of 
a compromise; the rejection of the argument that rules on the 
use of goods should be taken outside the scope of what is now 
article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC) came at the price of the 
 
126. See id. ¶ 33. 
127. See id. ¶ 52. 
128. See id. 
129. Id. ¶ 55. 
130. Id. ¶ 56. 
131. Id. ¶ 57 (citations omitted). The Grand Chamber of the ECJ rightly cited in 
support of this proposition the judgment in Commission v. Portugal. Id.; see also 
Commission v. Portugal, Case C-256/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245, ¶ 35. 
132. Italy, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 57. 
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acceptance of the justification advanced by the Italian 
authorities.133 As so often happens when the ECJ takes a stand on 
principle, the price is the acceptance of the measure in the 
instant case,134 and it may well be that this was the price needed 
to get majority agreement on use. First, the Grand Chamber 
really should know better than to state: 
[T]he prohibition . . . , to the extent that its effect is to 
hinder access to the Italian market for trailers which are 
specially designed for motorcycles and are lawfully produced 
and marketed in Member States other than the Italian 
Republic, constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of 
Article 28 EC, unless it can be justified objectively.135 
If a measure is justified, it does not cease to be a measure 
having equivalent effect; it is merely a measure which is accepted, 
having been reviewed for necessity and proportionality, because 
of the interest or value pursued. The trade-restricting effects do 
not disappear! This logical mistake is all too frequently made and 
really ought to stop. 
The judgment then turned to deal with the road safety 
argument.136 Italy claimed that “it introduced the measure 
because there were no type-approval rules, whether at the 
Community level or national level, to ensure that use of a 
motorcycle with a trailer was not dangerous.”137 In the absence of 
such a prohibition, the argument went, “circulation of a 
combination composed of a motorcycle and an unapproved 
trailer could be dangerous both for the driver of the vehicle and 
for other vehicles on the road, because the stability of the 
combination and its braking capacity would be affected.”138 The 
Grand Chamber of the ECJ had, understandably, no difficulty in 
finding that the prohibition in question was appropriate for the 
purpose of ensuring road safety. In the absence of fully 
 
133. See id. ¶ 60. 
134. Just one example illustrates the point. See Köbler v. Republik Österreich, Case 
C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10,239 (explicit acceptance of the principle of state liability 
for acts of the judiciary incompatible with Community law, but finding no liability in that 
case). 
135. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 58. 
136. See id. ¶¶ 60–61. 
137. Id. ¶ 63. 
138. Id. 
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harmonized rules, it was for the Member States to make up their 
own minds about the level of road safety which they wished to 
ensure, while taking account of the requirement of the free 
movement of goods.139 This meant that they had a margin of 
discretion: Member States could determine “the degree of 
protection which [they] wish[ed] to apply in regard to such 
safety and the way in which that degree of protection should be 
achieved.”140 Given that such “degree of protection might vary 
from one Member State to the other . . . the fact that one 
Member State imposes less strict rules than another Member 
State does not mean that the latter’s rules are 
disproportionate.”141 
Italy had submitted, without being contradicted by the 
Commission, that the combination of a motorcycle and a trailer 
is a danger to road safety.142 Although the burden of proof was 
on the Member State invoking “an imperative requirement as 
justification for the hindrance to free movement of goods to 
demonstrate that its rules are appropriate and necessary to attain 
the legitimate objective being pursued,” that did not mean that 
the Member State could be required to “prove, positively, that no 
other conceivable measure could enable that objective to be 
attained under the same conditions.”143 While the Grand 
Chamber acknowledged, as Advocate General Bot had observed, 
that it was possible to envisage other approaches, which could 
guarantee a certain level of road safety for the “circulation of a 
combination composed of a motorcycle and a trailer,” it felt that 
Member States could not be “denied the possibility of attaining 
an objective such as road safety by the introduction of general 
and simple rules which w[ould] be easily understood and applied 
 
139. See id. ¶ 61. The Grand Chamber of the ECJ referred to Commission v. Italy, 
Case 50/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1633, ¶ 12, and, by analogy, Commission v. Germany, Case C-
131/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-3303, ¶ 16. 
140. Italy, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 65. 
141. Id. The Grand Chamber of the ECJ referred by analogy to Commission v. 
Germany, Case C-141/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6935, ¶ 51; Commission v. France, Case C-
262/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-6609, ¶ 37. 
142. See Italy, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 66. 
143. Id. The Grand Chamber of the ECJ referred by analogy to Commission v. 
Netherlands, Case C-157/94, [1997] E.C.R. I-5699, ¶ 58. 
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by drivers and easily managed and supervised by the competent 
authorities.”144 
Quite simply, the Grand Chamber took a different view of 
the proportionality of the measure than Advocates General Léger 
and Bot did. However, the only real justification for a total 
prohibition, as opposed to a prohibition on certain roads or in 
certain places or situations, seems to be the convenience 
argument of ease of understanding, management, and 
supervision. The weakness of that argument is that it can be 
made of any extensive rule, including the Portuguese rule on 
tinted film in Commission v. Portugal,145 although in that case the 
absurdity was obvious, given that tinted glass was not prohibited. 
The Commission does not seem (at least so it appears from the 
judgment) to have been willing to tackle this general argument 
head on. But the Grand Chamber also ignored the point that 
foreign-registered motorcycles were allowed to tow trailers in 
Italy. Why the road safety argument should weigh so heavily on 
Italian-registered motorcycles is not apparent, although EU law 
does permit a Member State to disadvantage its own goods146 
(subject to any national law argument about equal treatment 
before the law).147 However, the proportionality of a measure is a 
matter on which opinions may well diverge, as in this case. As 
explained above, the Grand Chamber’s approach has the serious 
whiff of compromise about it.148 
Finally, the last nail in the coffin of the sirens seeking to 
remove restrictions on use from the ambit of measures having 
equivalent effect was firmly hammered in by the judgment of the 
Second Chamber of the ECJ in Mickelsson & Roos.149 Here, the 
Second Chamber unsurprisingly in effect cut and pasted from 
the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Commission v. Italy in 
 
144. Italy, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 67. The Grand Chamber of the ECJ also observed 
that it could not be presumed that “road safety could be ensured at the same level as 
envisaged by the Italian Republic by a partial prohibition of the circulation of such a 
combination or by a road traffic authorisation issued subject to compliance with certain 
conditions.” Id. ¶ 68. 
145. Commission v. Portugal, Case C-256/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245. 
146. Thus the German government could maintain the Reinheitsgebot (beer purity 
law) for beer brewed in Germany for consumption in Germany. 
147. See Criminal Proceedings against Guimont, Case C-448/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-
10,663. 
148. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
149. See Åklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos, Case C-142/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-4273. 
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rejecting the approach of Advocate General Kokott in Mickelsson 
& Roos.150 The difference in this case was that it was not a direct 
action but a reference under the then article 234 EC (article 267 
TFEU).151 Thus applying the touchstone to the facts was a matter 
for the national court: 
[W]here the national regulations for the designation of 
navigable waters and waterways have the effect of preventing 
users of personal watercraft from using them for the specific 
and inherent purposes for which they were intended or of 
greatly restricting their use, which is for the national court to 
ascertain, such regulations have the effect of hindering the 
access to the domestic market in question for those goods 
and therefore constitute, save where there is a justification 
pursuant to Article 30 EC or there are overriding public 
interest requirements, measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on imports prohibited by Article 28 
EC.152 
This time the formula at the end is more promisingly 
formulated: justified measures are not described as not being 
measures having equivalent effect, but rather as not being 
measures having equivalent effect prohibited by article 28 EC 
(article 34 TFEU). The situation was clear; the rejection of Ms. 
Kokott’s view implicit. All that remained was to consider the 
alleged justification. 
The Swedish government had contended that the 
regulations involved prohibiting the use of jet skis were justified 
by the objective of environmental protection and the objectives 
referred to in article 30 EC (article 36 TFEU).153 Sweden further 
argued that “[t]he restriction on the use of personal watercraft to 
particular waters ma[de] it possible, inter alia, to prevent 
unacceptable environmental disturbances”; “[t]he use of 
personal watercraft ha[d] negative consequences for fauna, in 
particular where such a craft [was] used for a lengthy period on a 
small area or driven at great speed”; “[t]he noise as a whole 
disturb[ed] people and animals and above all certain protected 
 
150. Id. ¶ 28. 
151. See id.; see also TFEU, supra note 1, art. 267, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 164; EC Treaty, 
supra note 1, art. 234, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 135–36. 
152. Mickleson & Roos, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 28. 
153. See id. 
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species of birds,” and, moreover, “the easy transport of personal 
watercraft facilitated the spread of animal diseases.”154 
The Second Chamber acknowledged that the protection of 
the health and life of humans, animals, and plants under article 
30 EC (article 36 TFEU) was distinct from the case-law-based 
justification on the ground of environmental protection, but 
decided to examine all these grounds together.155 It had no 
difficulty in concluding that a restriction or prohibition on the 
use of personal watercraft was an appropriate means of ensuring 
environmental protection, but then turned to the question of 
proportionality.156 Here too, as in Commission v. Italy,157 the ECJ 
was influenced by what was practical and manageable. The 
Swedish government submitted that “the prohibition on the use 
of personal watercraft l[eft] users of those craft with not less than 
300 general navigable waterways on the Swedish coast and on the 
large lakes, which constitute[ed] a very extensive area.”158 
Moreover, it submitted, “the geographical position of those 
aquatic areas in Sweden preclude[d] measures of a scope” 
different from that of the provisions concerned.159 The Second 
Chamber showed some, but not an unrestricted, understanding 
of this position, noting that although measures other than the 
regulation at issue “could guarantee a certain level of protection 
of the environment,” Member States could not be “denied the 
possibility of attaining an objective such as the protection of the 
environment by the introduction of general rules which [were] 
necessary on account of the particular geographical 
circumstances of the Member State concerned and easily 
managed and supervised by the national authorities.”160 
However, the Second Chamber paid careful attention to the 
proportionality argument. It noted that the Swedish regulations 
provided for “a general prohibition of the use of personal 
watercraft on waters other than general navigable waterways” 
unless the former has been designated for use by personal 
watercraft; the designating authority was empowered, but in a 
 
154. Id. ¶ 30. 
155. See id. ¶¶ 31–33. 
156. See id. ¶¶ 30–32. 
157. Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519. 
158. Mickelsson & Roos, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 35. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. ¶ 36. 
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number of circumstances obliged, to issue such rules.161 As to the 
allegedly necessary nature of the measure in question, the 
wording of the national regulations themselves suggested that, on 
waters which had to be “designated by implementing measures, 
personal watercraft may be used without giving rise to risks or 
pollution deemed unacceptable for the environment.”162 The 
result was inevitable: “[A] general prohibition on using such 
goods on waters other than general navigable waterways 
constitute a measure going beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the aim of protection of the environment.”163 But where (1) 
there was a requirement imposed on the competent authorities 
to adopt implementing measures, (2) those authorities had 
“actually made use of the power conferred on them and 
designated the waters which satisfy the conditions provided for by 
the national regulations,” and (3) those measures were “adopted 
within a reasonable period after the entry into force of those 
regulations,”164 regulations prohibiting or restricting the use of 
personal watercraft could be justified by the aim of the 
protection of the environment.165 It was for the national court to 
ascertain whether those conditions had been satisfied.166 
Although the Second Chamber emphasized that the 
assessment of the facts was indeed a matter for the national 
court, it felt that, in a spirit of cooperation with national courts, it 
should provide the national court with all the guidance that it 
deemed necessary.167 The Second Chamber noted that the 
national regulations had been in force only for about three weeks 
when the fines were issued to the defendants.168 The Second 
Chamber went on to state: 
The fact that measures to implement those regulations had 
not been adopted at a time when those regulations had only 
just entered into force ought not necessarily to affect the 
proportionality of those regulations in so far as the 
 
161. Id. ¶ 37. 
162. Id. ¶ 38. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. ¶ 39. 
165. See id. ¶ 40. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. ¶ 41. 
168. See id. ¶ 42. 
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competent authority may not have had the necessary time to 
prepare the measures in question. 169 
But that was a matter for the national court. Then the 
Second Chamber added an important proviso to ensure that the 
defendants would not be prejudiced compared to what their 
situation would have been had the appropriate implementing 
measures been adopted: 
[I]f the national court were to find that implementing 
measures were adopted within a reasonable time but after 
the material time of the events in the main proceedings and 
that those measures designate as navigable waters the waters 
in which the accused in the main proceedings used personal 
watercraft and consequently had proceedings brought 
against them, then, for the national regulations to remain 
proportionate and therefore justified in the light of the aim 
of protection of the environment, the accused would have to 
be allowed to rely on that designation; that is also dictated by 
the general principle of Community law of the retroactive 
application of the most favourable criminal law and the most 
lenient penalty.170 
This judgment offers a very delicate balance of the interests 
involved. Inaction by the administration would clearly be fatal to 
the national measures, and the defendants should, if national 
measures had subsequently been adopted within a reasonable 
time concerning the waters on which the defendants had used 
their jet skis, be able to rely on that designation so as to escape 
any penalty which would otherwise be imposed. The Second 
Chamber of the ECJ was clearly taking account of the fact that 
the case was received by the ECJ on March 24, 2005 and 
judgment was finally given on June 4, 2009.171 
These three judgments offer a very mixed picture, putting 
the emphasis firmly on market access while taking very 
interesting—and frankly not always terribly consistent—
 
169. Id. 
170. Id. ¶ 43. The Second Chamber cited in support of this proposition the 
judgment in Criminal Proceedings against Berlusconi, in which it had found that the 
principle of the retrospective application of the more lenient penalty formed part of the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Id. (citing Criminal 
Proceedings against Berlusconi, Joined Cases C-387, 391, 403/02, [2005] E.C.R. I-3565, 
¶ 68). 
171. See generally Mickelsson & Roos, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273. 
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approaches to the justifications advanced by the Member States 
concerned. In particular, the approach to road safety seems to 
depend on the length of the proverbial Lord Chancellor’s foot! 
The care which the Second Chamber of the ECJ took over the 
proportionality question in Mickelsson & Roos172 and the Third 
Chamber took in Commission v. Portugal173 stands in shrill contrast 
to the frankly cavalier approach of the Grand Chamber in the 
face of the carefully considered approach on proportionality 
suggested by Advocates General Léger and Bot. 
The ECJ in these judgments places great emphasis on the 
position of the consumer in relation to market access. Thus, in 
Commission v. Portugal, the Third Chamber noted that, because of 
a prohibition on affixing tinted film, potential customers, 
traders, or individuals had practically no interest in buying tinted 
film.174 In Commission v. Italy, the Grand Chamber spoke of the 
prohibition having considerable influence on the behavior of 
consumers, which, in its turn, affected the access of the product 
to the Italian market, so that consumers, knowing that they were 
not permitted to use their motorcycle with a trailer specially 
designed for it, had practically no interest in buying such a 
trailer.175 This formula was repeated in relation to personal 
watercraft in Mickelsson & Roos by the Second Chamber.176 
Clearly the point is that if use is prohibited there will be no 
purchasers. But this emphasis on the consumer is also perfectly 
appropriate in relation to selling arrangements, such as price-
cutting campaigns, and even shop closing hours. If restriction of 
market access is to be the criterion on which measures are to be 
judged, which is the line taken in Commission v. Italy and 
effectively in Mickelsson & Roos, what is the place of certain 
selling arrangements, and why should the consumer’s interest 
there weigh less heavily than in the use cases, and particularly 
than in Commission v. Portugal? What precisely is left of Keck? Is 
 
172. Id. 
173. Commission v. Portugal, Case C-265/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245. 
174. Id. ¶ 33. 
175. Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009], E.C.R. I-519, ¶¶ 56–57. 
176. See Mickelsson & Roos, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶¶ 26–27. 
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the ECJ trying, as Eleanor Spaventa has deliciously put it, to have 
its Keck and eat it, too?177 
III. YOU CAN’T ABDICATE AND EAT IT178 
The central problem with the ECJ’s approach in these three 
judgments is that it is trying to situate a market access approach 
firmly in the line of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, while 
maintaining the exclusion of certain selling arrangements—still 
famously undefined—which satisfy the two Keck conditions. As 
observed above, the judgments cited in support of this approach 
only partly support it and in fact deal with very different 
situations indeed. Sandoz concerned a prosecution for selling 
food and beverages which contained unauthorized additives; the 
comments about access to markets on which the products 
concerned were not previously represented were made in the 
context of the requirement under Dutch legislation that the 
importer prove that the marketing of the product concerned met 
a market demand.179 Cassis de Dijon concerned a national 
minimum alcohol content for fruit liqueurs.180 Both Sandoz and 
Cassis de Dijon dealt with products from other Member States that 
were actually lawfully produced and marketed there, as do the 
three judgments discussed in this Article,181 albeit that the latter 
all concern the use of a product rather than a straightforward 
prohibition on its sale. As the ECJ rightly saw, though, if the use 
of a product for the purpose for which it is manufactured is 
prohibited, the effect in practice is the same as a prohibition. 
Finally, Keck concerned a prohibition on resale at less than the 
purchase price, a classic selling technique designed to promote 
the goods concerned.182 As suggested above, the consumer’s 
 
177. Eleanor Spaventa, Leaving Keck Behind? The Free Movement of Goods After the 
Rulings in Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos, 34 EUR. L. REV. 914, 921 
(2009). 
178. As Wallis Simpson is said to have remarked to Edward VIII. See JOHN JULIUS 
NORWICH, TRYING TO PLEASE 48 (2008). 
179. Criminal Proceedings against Sandoz BV, Case 174/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2445, 
¶¶ 2, 4, 25–27. 
180. Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, ¶ 3. 
181. In Mickelsson & Roos, there was no specific indication whether the jet skis used 
were actually imported or not. 
182. Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 
268/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶ 2. 
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interest in having access to products under favorable conditions 
is in fact as much present in relation to price campaigns as it is in 
relation to being able to use a product. 
In Commission v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ sought 
to set out the principles of the free movement of goods: (1) the 
basic principle in Dassonville, (2) the concepts of non-
discrimination, mutual recognition, and market access, and (3) 
the exemption from the concept of measures having equivalent 
effect for measures which satisfy the Keck criteria.183 This caused 
the ECJ to conclude that the following are to be regarded as 
measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on 
imports: 
(1) “measures adopted by a Member State the object or 
effect of which is to treat products coming from other Member 
States less favourably”;184 
(2) “obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the 
consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member 
States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules 
that lay down requirements to be met by such goods . . . even if 
those rules apply to all products alike”185; and 
(3) “any other measure which hinders access of products 
originating in other Member States to the market of a Member 
State is also covered by that concept.”186 
Given that the Grand Chamber expressly maintained the 
Keck treatment of certain selling arrangements, it is clear that it 
did not want to signal a retreat from its treatment of matters such 
as shop closing; 187 restrictions on advertising188 (other than 
 
183. Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009], E.C.R. I-519, ¶¶ 33–36. 
184. Id. ¶ 37. 
185. Id. ¶ 35. 
186. Id. ¶ 37. These headings are hereinafter referred to as heading (1), heading 
(2) and heading (3) respectively. 
187. See, e.g., Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Ebrusco, Joined 
Cases C-418–21, 460–62, 464/93, 9–11, 14–15, 23–24, 332/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2975; 
Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Commune di Capena, Joined Cases C-69 & 258/93, 
[1994] E.C.R. I-2355; see also GORMLEY, supra note 20, at 409–10. 
188. See, e.g., Société d’Importation Édouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA, 
Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-179; Hünermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-
Württemberg, Case C-292/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-6787. But as to advertising restrictions 
affecting the presentation or packaging of the product itself, see Douwe Egberts NV v. 
Westrom Pharma NV, Case C-239/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7007; Vereinigte Familiapress 
Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997] 
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where the restriction closed off access completely);189 itinerant 
sales;190 and doorstep sales.191 Thomas Horsley has argued that, 
by choosing not to follow the approach suggested by Advocate 
General Kokott and equating restrictions on use with selling 
arrangements, the ECJ has once again brought within the scope 
of article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC) a category of equally 
applicable measures without the need to demonstrate any 
discriminatory effect.192 The better view, it is submitted, is that 
the Court actually chose to treat restrictions on use as being rules 
concerning the products, as opposed to being non-product-based 
rules. Horsley is correct to say that Member States will have to 
justify their preferences within the strict derogations 
framework,193 but this is nothing more than what the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (and previously the EC 
Treaty) actually envisages, and is the logical consequence of a 
finding that the measure is a measure having equivalent effect.194 
The Grand Chamber failed to mention the problem of goods 
originating outside of the European Union but placed in free 
circulation within a Member State and lawfully marketed there, 
then exported into another Member State. However, as the facts 
were confined to products lawfully produced and marketed 
within the European Union, the wording is unsurprising. 
Horsley submits that the measures set out in heading (3) 
above195 are subject to the requirement that the effect on market 
access goes beyond a certain degree;196 he also submits that after 
Mickelsson & Roos, for measures merely restricting (as opposed to 
 
E.C.R. I-3689; Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln e.V. v. Mars GmbH, 
Case C-470/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-1923. 
189. See, e.g., Konsumentenombudsmannen v. De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB, 
Joined Cases C-34-36/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3843. 
190. See, e.g., Konsumentenombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int’l Products AB, Case C-
405/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-1795; Criminal Proceedings against Burmanjer, Case C-20/03, 
[2005] E.C.R. I-4133. 
191. See, e.g., A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v. Schmidt, Case C-441/04, [2006] 
E.C.R. I-2093. 
192. Thomas Horsley, Anyone for Keck?, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 2001, 2010–11 
(2009). 
193. See id. at 2012. 
194. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 36, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 35; EC Treaty, supra note 1, 
art. 28, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 52. This is supplemented by the ECJ’s case-law-based 
justifications, as tested against the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
195. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
196. Horsley, supra note 192, at 2013. 
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prohibiting) use, the new market access test is subject to a 
requirement that the restriction impede market access to a 
sufficient degree.197 He bases this argument on paragraph 26 of 
the latter judgment: 
[T]he restriction which they impose on the use of a product 
in the territory of a Member State may, depending on its 
scope, have a considerable influence on the behaviour of 
consumers, which may, in turn, affect the access of that 
product to the market of that Member State.198 
In paragraph 28 the Second Chamber stated: 
[W]here the national regulations for the designation of 
navigable waters and waterways have the effect of preventing 
users of personal watercraft from using them for the specific 
and inherent purposes for which they were intended or of 
greatly restricting their use, which is for the national court to 
ascertain, such regulations have the effect of hindering the 
access to the domestic market in question.199 
It is respectfully submitted that it would be wholly contrary 
to the demands of a single market within the European Union to 
see a market access test subject to a certain degree of 
impediment. Not only has the ECJ constantly rejected attempts to 
plead de minimis,200 but it would also make nonsense of the ECJ’s 
approach in those cases where the territorial effect of a measure 
has been confined to a part of a Member State.201 The degree of 
use restriction which would be caught was left unsaid, but it 
surely cannot have been the intention of the Second Chamber to 
reverse earlier case law and introduce a de minimis exception 
through the back door. Although the expression, “a considerable 
influence on the behaviour of consumers, which, in its turn, 
affects the access of that product to the market of that Member 
State[,]” is also found in paragraph 56 of Commission v. Italy, in 
paragraph 57 the Grand Chamber made it clear that the measure 
prevented a demand from existing in the market at issue for such 
 
197. See id. at 2015. 
198. Åklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos, Case C-142/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 26. 
199. See id. ¶ 28. 
200. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
201. See, e.g., Criminal Proceedings against Bluhme, Case C-67/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-
8033 (measures to protect a rare and endangered species on a small island in 
Denmark); Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v. Unità Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Carrara, 
Case C-21/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-889. 
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trailers and therefore hindered their importation.202 Accordingly, 
on policy grounds, it is submitted that any impression that the 
ECJ will permit de minimis restrictions on use is ill-founded. The 
ECJ has shown that it is prepared to use the proportionality test 
robustly in Commission v. Portugal and Mickelsson & Roos, yet 
timidly in Commission v. Italy. But it is manifest that the 
application of principles to facts will involve a careful 
examination of the proportionality of the measure, particularly 
in the case of measures governing the use of products. In relation 
to heading (3) above, Spaventa rightly states that the Grand 
Chamber was unclear about the meaning of the phrase “any 
other measure.” She identifies a possible narrow interpretation 
as any measure that is neither a selling arrangement meeting the 
Keck criteria nor a product requirement; she also identifies a 
wider interpretation as embracing any non-discriminatory 
measure, including selling arrangements, apart from product 
requirements, which are always regarded as hindering intra-
European Union trade.203 It is submitted that this simply means 
any measure not covered by headings (1) or (2) above.204 
Spaventa has argued that the Keck distinction based on the 
type of rules is no longer relevant, and that what now matters is 
the effect of the rules on market access.205 The ECJ itself does not 
appear to see it that way in its judgments. Although market access 
plays the central role in the argumentation, the intention of the 
ECJ is not to revise its view of the certain selling arrangements as 
expressed in Keck, nor to revise the conditions under which it 
declares article 34 TFEU inapplicable. On the other hand, the 
exceptional status of those measures which do satisfy the Keck 
criteria is more and more anomalous. Perhaps the truth is that 
the ECJ is not thinking in terms of grand theory, but is actually 
simply deciding, on a case-by-case basis, the reasonableness of 
national measures. The ECJ does not particularly have an eye to 
theoretical considerations, and it is worth recalling that judges 
are more concerned with sorting out disputes than forming a 
 
202. Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶¶ 56–57. 
203. See Spaventa, supra note 177, at 921. 
204. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
205. See Spaventa, supra note 177, at 928–29. The article by P. Wenneras & K. Boe 
Moen, Selling Arrangements, Keeping Keck, 35 EUR. L. REV. 387 (2010) was published well 
after this contribution was submitted; it has not been possible to take account of it at 
proof stage. 
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coherent doctrine, even though they try to be consistent as much 
as possible. If the approach in Keck was a reaction to 
management concerns about the ECJ being flooded out by 
litigants seeking to challenge any national rule which prevented 
them from trading quite as they wished, the cases on the use of 
goods discussed in this Article signal the end of the slippery slope 
approach of allowing any expansion of the type of measures 
which the ECJ will accept as not being caught by article 34 TFEU 
(article 28 EC). 
One further point should be mentioned: the judgments in 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson & Roos were a very long time in 
gestation; the decision to re-open the oral procedure in 
Commission v. Italy and have it considered by the Grand Chamber 
brought an understandable delay, but clearly there must have 
been a robust discussion at the deliberations in these two cases. It 
seems, with respect, that pragmatism triumphed, and that recent 
reports of the death of Keck may, like those of Mark Twain’s 
death, prove to be greatly exaggerated.206 
CONCLUSION 
All the above simply goes to show how much more sensible 
it would be for the ECJ simply to say that measures affecting the 
use of goods fall under the basic principle in Dassonville, and 
have to be justified now under article 36 TFEU or under the case-
law-based justifications. Market access should not be seen as a 
criterion as such, but merely as an example of a measure which 
can hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade 
between Member States. The ECJ meant what it said in 
Dassonville, and it is time that people realized it! The time for a 
unified approach to the freedoms of the internal market has 
certainly come and that must involve a reassessment of Keck, but 
the Dassonville basic principle said it all in 1974; mutual 
recognition put the icing on the cake in Cassis de Dijon, and that 
is all that was necessary. Market access is a nice shorthand for 
Dassonville, but not a substitute for it. 
Gordon Slynn was a pragmatic man; his analysis was always 
clear and to the point, but firmly founded on common sense, 
 
206. See Fachverband der Buch und Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-531/07, [2009] E.C.R. 3717. 
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without being tied to dogma for the sake of fitting into doctrinal 
straightjackets. He well understood that while in the good 
continental tradition, the professors, not the judges, “hold the 
law,” judges have to deal with the disputes before them in a 
manner which seeks to balance competing interests and leads to 
an effective and satisfactory solution. In a committee situation in 
which one judgment is produced, compromises in reasoning are 
inevitable if a majority is to be secured for a particular outcome: 
result orientation abounds, and concessions on a broad scope of 
a principle may have to be met by concessions on the assessment 
of proportionality. The solution in Commission v. Portugal and in 
Mickelsson & Roos is to be welcomed; the solution in Commission v. 
Italy is mystifying and cries out for harmonization. That the ECJ 
has not quite managed to please everyone with its reasoning on 
the scope of article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC), and its reasoning on 
proportionality in these cases on the use of goods may indeed be 
disappointing, but Gordon would not have found it unexpected. 
In heaven, Dassonville will be found, and surely a good claret or 
burgundy too; Gordon will be cellar master. May his memory live 
long! 
